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Nicholas Terry
›Do not burden one’s own army and its hinterland 
with unneeded mouths !‹
The Fate of the Soviet Civilian Population Behind the ›Panther Line‹ 
in Eastern Belorussia, October 1943-June 1944
The battles of Army Group Centre in eastern Belorussia during the winter of 1943 /44 
have been rightly called »an unknown war«.1 From October 1943 to June 1944, while 
the forces of Army Groups South and A were forced to retreat from Ukraine and the 
Crimea to the borders of Hungary and Romania, the 1, million German troops and 
auxiliaries belonging to Army Group Centre held off a series of offensives aimed at 
Vitebsk, Mogilev, Orsha and Bobruisk, inflicting significant casualties on Soviet 
forces.3 Only on the southern flank of the army group did the Soviets make greater 
progress over the winter of 1943 /44, taking in succession the towns of Gomel, Rechit-
sa, Mozyr and Rogachev between November 1943 and February 1944.4
The fighting along the so-called ›Panther Line‹, to which Army Group Centre had 
retreated at the end of September 1943, not only cost the Red Army close to one mil-
lion casualties, but also caused immense suffering to the approximately .4 million 
Soviet civilians inhabiting the army group’s remaining zone of operations. Research 
on Wehrmacht occupation policy has often portrayed events during this final phase 
of the war in the east as falling under the heading of »crimes of the retreat« 
(Rückzugsverbrechen).5 In particular, much attention has been paid in recent years to 
1 Karl-Heinz Frieser, Der Rückzug der Heeresgruppe Mitte nach Weissrussland, in: Das Deut-
sche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd : Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten. 
München, 011, pp. 9-33.
 From October 1943 to the end of June 1944, troop strengths, including Luftwaffe, SS, Osttrup-
pen, Hungarian forces and auxiliaries, fluctuated between 1.10.000 and 1.4.333. OKH/
Chef.H.Rüst.u.BdE /VA/Ag V III/Pl 1, Zusammenstellung der Verpflegungsstärken des Feld-
heeres im Osten, Stand 1. 10. 43, 1. 1. 43, 1.1-1. . 44, US National Archives and Records Admi-
nistration Record Group 4, T /1199 /9-50. Hereafter, all T-documents cited are from 
NARA.
3 Between October 1943 and 1 April 1944, for example, the Soviet Western Front lost 330.53 
casualties, while two offensives aimed at Vitebsk cost the 1st Baltic Front 303.14 casualties. Cf. 
V. V. Gurkin, ›Liudskie poteri Sovetskikh vooruzhenn’ikh sil v 1941-1945 gg: nov’ie aspekt’i’‹ 
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal , 1999, p. .
4 At a cost of at least 15.640 casualties. Cf. G. F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat 
Losses in the Twentieth Century, London 199, pp. 109 f.; Konstantin Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s 
Duty, Moscow 195, pp. 16-30.
5 Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde. Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in 
Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944, Hamburg 1999, pp. 109-110; Dieter Pohl, Die Herrschaft der 
Wehrmacht. Deutsche Militärbesatzung und einheimische Bevölkerung in der Sowjetunion 
1941-1944, München 00, pp. 31-331.
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the perhaps most spectacular example of a Rückzugsverbrechen on the Eastern Front, 
the abandonment of 45.000 women, children, elderly and sick in three camps near 
the small town of Ozarichi in mid-March 1944.6 While the course of this atrocity has 
been reconstructed by a number of German scholars, notably by Christoph Rass, 
insufficient attention has hitherto been paid to the context of this crime, and the fact 
that a similar action, Operation ›Himmelfahrt‹, was repeated at Vitebsk in June 1944, 
abandoning over 5.000 sick and unfit civilians, has remained almost entirely un-
known. While both actions took place during minor tactical retreats, to perceive 
them as crimes produced solely by the retreat of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front 
would be to misunderstand their true causes. Rather, both occurred during a pro-
longed phase of relatively successful defensive combat lasting nine months.
Contextualising Ozarichi and its sister atrocity at Vitebsk therefore offers the op-
portunity to reexamine the conduct of the Wehrmacht in the final phase of the occu-
pation of the Soviet Union. What impact did the course of military operations have 
on policies towards the civilian population? How did factors such as food and labour 
resources as well as epidemics interact to generate such dramatic actions? And how 
did the staffs of Army Group Centre and its subordinate armies talk themselves into 
such drastic decisions? Evidence for the decision-making leading up to Ozarichi and 
›Himmelfahrt‹ exists in abundance, above all in the records of the quartermaster and 
economics staffs at corps, army and army group level. While these sources can be read 
for their recounting of events, the reports and orders can also be seen as a remarkably 
consistent discourse regarding the importance of living off the land for not only food 
but also civilian labour, as well as the »necessary« measures to be taken towards civil-
ians unfit for work. As »objects of military necessity«, to use Isabel Hull’s felicitous 
phrase, civilians disappeared as civilians in the eyes of German military staffs, and 
were reclassified as enemy, helper or hindrance. Reasoning from pragmatic premises, 
Wehrmacht commanders, staff officers and their civil servant advisors in the eco-
nomics staffs produced strikingly similar analyses of the situation of Soviet civilians 
inhabiting the combat zone. The effects of war left the region under German occu-
pation with a much-reduced labour force on the one hand, and a much-reduced ag-
6 For Soviet sources, largely reproducing reports and eyewitness testimonies gathered by the 
Soviet Extraordinary State Commission, see S. I. Beluga (ed), Prestupleniia nemetsko-fashist-
skikh okkupantov v Belorussii. Minsk 1965, pp. 11-13 and the comprehensive documentary 
collection by G. D. Knatko et al (eds), Zalozhniki vermakhta (Ozarichi – lager smerti). Doku-
menty i materialy, Minsk 1999.
 Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde (wie Anm. 5), pp. 109-99; Hans Heinrich Nolte, Osarici 1944, 
in: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Hg.), Orte des Grauens. Verbrechen im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Darm-
stadt 003, pp. 16-194; Christoph Rass, »Menschenmaterial«: deutsche Soldaten an der Ost-
front. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision, 1939-1945, Paderborn 003, pp. 36-40 and 
Christoph Rass, Ozarichi 1944. Entscheidungs- und Handlungsebenen eines Kriegsverbre-
chen, in: Timm C. Richter (Hg.), Krieg und Verbrechen. Situation und Intention: Fallbei-
spiele, München 006, pp. 15-195.
 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction; Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial 
Germany, Ithaca 005, pp. 6-6.
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ricultural base on the other. Much of the remaining population consisted of the elder-
ly and the immobile, above all mothers with young children. The feeding and 
accommodation of these ›dregs‹ (Bodensatz), as an order signed by leader of the Ger-
man military opposition Henning von Tresckow characterised them, represented 
nothing but a drain on dwindling resources.9 The division of the population into 
those fit for work (Arbeitsfähige) and those unfit for work (Arbeitsunfähige) was the 
logical solution. Implementing that division at Ozarichi and Vitebsk, as this article 
shows, involved measures that echo much that is familiar from the Nazi ›Final Solu-
tion of the Jewish Question‹: selections; train transports; death marches; the involve-
ment of the SS; and barbed wire camps.
Labour Mobilisation and Civilian Evacuation as Wehrmacht Doctrine. The dy-
namic that led to Ozarichi and Vitebsk was in several respects nothing new for Army 
Group Centre and its four constituent armies (from north to south, 3rd Panzer, 4th, 9th 
and nd Armies), or indeed elsewhere on the Easterm Front. It was the direct conse-
quence of the German military practices of the labour mobilisation and agricultural 
exploitation of the frontline divisional, corps and army zones on the one hand, and 
the desire of commanders of frontline divisions to remove unwanted civilians imme-
diately behind the frontline to a depth of up to 0 km on the other. In trench warfare 
conditions, these practices almost invariably generated substantial numbers of refu-
gees, and could easily deplete the agricultural labour force by proletarianising the 
peasantry as trench-diggers, setting into motion a vicious circle of agricultural decline 
that only exacerbated the consequences of ›living off the land‹ and requisitioning 
food for Wehrmacht purposes. Following the summer battles at Rzhev in 194, for 
example, 9th Army reported that »the further reductions in agricultural acreage are the 
consequences of these great defensive battles.«10 This was not the result of the loss of 
ground, as hardly any penetration into German defences had been made, but because 
of increased conscription of peasants during the defensive battle. In this fashion, even 
unsuccessful Soviet offensives left bruises behind the German frontline.
While commanders had already gone over to the conscription of peasant labour 
for military purposes by spring 194, this practice became enshrined as operational 
doctrine by a series of Hitler orders from September 194 onwards.11 After the defeat 
at Stalingrad, and in conjunction with the decision to withdraw from the Demyansk 
and Rzhev salient, labour mobilisation and the evacuation of military-age males was 
decreed in ›Führer Order No 4‹, while the impressment and evacuation of women 
was demanded in ›Führer Order No. ‹ along with the evacuation of a 0 km deep 
zone of all superfluous civilians.1 Already in December 194, 4th Army had com-
9 AOK  OQu / AWiFü / VII/Qu., Erfassung von 10 bis 13jährigen Jungen und Mädchen bei 
Bandenunternehmen, 6. 6. 44, gez v. Tresckow, T31 /1300 /99.
10 AWiFü AOK 9, Erläuterung über die taktische Lage, . 10. 4, Imperial War Museum (IWM), 
MI 14 /31.
11 Der Führer / OKH/GenStdH/Op. Abt., Grundsätzliche Aufgaben der Verteidigung, . 9. 194, 
issued as OKH/GenStdH/Op.Abt (I) Nr 11153 /4 g.Kdos, 11. 9. 4, Führerbefehl, 
T /345 /63033-45.
1 PzAOK 3 Ia, Führer Order No.4, . . 43, NOKW-1965, Case 1, Prosecution Document 
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plained that »the peasant population is being continually decimated. The removal of 
one-third of the necessary agricultural workforce was rendered all the more danger-
ous, as many younger men who might normally be expected to lead by example were 
now absent.«13 A solution to the contradiction was found only by compelling the 
peasantry to do double duty as farmers and forced labourers. »To ensure a rational 
employment of labourers,” the army reported in April 1943, »the assembly of labour-
ers in ›labour villages‹ (Arbeitsdörfer) is foreseen in connection with the evacuation of 
the 0 km zone.« In IX Corps, these were labelled »collection villages« (Sammeldörfer).14
The regimentation of the peasantry went hand in hand with the deportation of the 
so-called excess civilian population to the rear. In 194 and early 1943, before any sys-
tematic withdrawals had taken place, the frontline armies of Army Group Centre 
displaced around 300.000 civilians to the rear, in particular from the Rzhev salient, 
both to the westernmost regions of the army group rear area, as well as to the civil-
ian-administered Generalkommissariat (GK) Weissruthenien, which had received 
around 30.000 evacuees by February 1943, again dispersing the refugees into the 
countryside.15 This did not prevent the deaths from starvation of between 15 and 
0.000 Russian civilians in Rzhev and the surrounding area before its liberation in 
March 1943.16
From March 1943, in the course of systematic withdrawals, ever larger numbers of 
civilians, reaching the number of over 0.000, were displaced westwards in order to 
deny their labour power to the advancing Soviets. 130.000 (41,3 % of the population) 
were evacuated from the Rzhev salient in March, 0.500 (, %) from the Orel 
bend in August, and 535.000 (,5 %) from Smolensk and the easternmost regions of 
Belorussia given up during the retreat to the ›Panther Line‹ in September 1943.1 More 
than 110.000 evacuees from the Rzhev and Orel areas were deported to the Reichs-
kommissariat Ostland, while around 5.000 from the Panther Line withdrawal were 
also transferred there by November 1943.1 While the earlier evacuations proceeded 
without significant interference and could be carried out using rail transports, lack of 
trains meant that the evacuation to the Panther Line was carried out by foot marches. 
Book A, pp. f.; Der Führer / OKH/GenStdH/Op.Abt., Führerbefehl Nr. , 5. 3. 43, IWM, MI 
14 /64; c. f. AOK 9 Ia / A.Pi.Fü./Ic / OQu / Qu., Führerbefehl Nr. , 0. 3. 43, T31 /309 /611-
0.
13 Tätigkeits- und Lagebericht AWiFü AOK 4, 16. 1. 4-15. 1. 43, T /111 /5.
14 Lagebericht IX AK Qu, 3. 4. 43, T314 /45 /436; AOK 4 OQu / Qu.1, Beurteilung der Versor-
gungslage, . 4. 43, T31 /19 /454 (citation).
15 Nicholas Terry, The German Army Group Centre and the Soviet Civilian Population 194-
1944, PhD, King’s College London 005, pp. 19-0.
16 See the figures in Komitet Rzhevskogo gorodskogo soveta, Akt No 59, 16. . 43; Akt o zlodei-
aniiakh nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov Rzhevskom raione, 5. . 44, Gosudarstvennye 
Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii 01-6-510, pp. , 13R; further evidence cited in Terry, German 
Army Group Centre (wie Anm. 15), pp. 19-01.
1 WiIn Mitte, Lagebericht Nr. 34, 1. 10. 43, T /1101 /51.
1 AOK  OQu / Qu. an Hgr Mitte OQu.Qu., . 10. 43, T31 /169 /909-911; Terry, German 
Army Group Centre (wie Anm. 15), pp. 0-14.
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The speed of the Soviet advance led nd Army to drive a column of around 45.000 
evacuees into forests away from the Gomel bridgehead by nd Army, while 9th Army 
abandoned close to 100.000 evacuees around Pochep, Klintsy and Unecha.19
Each stage of the German retreat was planned as a progressive fallback to a new 
defensive line, which was to be built using the forced labour of the civilian popula-
tion. Whether given a codename borrowed from Wagner’s operas (›Hagen‹) or the 
zoo (›Schildkröte‹, ›Maulwurf‹, ›Panther‹, ›Bärenstellung‹), these stoplines became the 
loci for a thorough sieving and massive displacement of the population caught in the 
path of the German retreat.0 Preparations for the ›Panther Line‹, the army group’s 
name for the grandiosely entitled Ostwall, began especially early. Already in March 
1943, the codeword ›Panther‹ was in use to describe the construction of a rear defense 
line east of Mogilev.1 In August 1943, Hitler issued ›Führer Order No. 10‹, ordering 
the rapid construction of the Ostwall using civilian labourers. Army Group Centre 
estimated that 400,000 civilians would be needed for this task, but could at first only 
mobilise a fraction of this number from evacuees and the local population.3
After settling into position behind the ›Panther Line‹, at the end of November 
1943, Army Group Centre was ordered by its new commander, Field Marshal Ernst 
Busch, to establish permanent civilian labour battalions, the so-called Zivilarbeits-
dienstabteilungen or ZADAs, conscripted from men and women above the age of 16 
and divided by sex into companies.4 The four frontline armies progressively extend-
ed their dragnets 5, 10, 0 and finally 100 km behind the frontline. The rear areas 
were now scourged by ›registration actions‹ (Erfassungsaktionen) to bring in trench-dig-
gers. 4th Army sought to harvest 6.900 labourers from Borisov and Krupka rayons, 
located in the far west of its army area, for a construction brigade assigned to build 
the ›Biber‹ position.5 9th Army similarly designated the region east of the Berezina as 
the target of its own Erfassungsaktion, arresting 4.950 men and 1.000 women, intern-
ing them in Dulag 131 in Bobruisk in the days before New Year’s Eve, 1943.6
ZADAs conscripted in the rear areas were then shipped forward to the frontline, 
and the routing and unloading of civilian labourers became a prominent part of the 
19 Tätigkeitsbericht Räumungsstab Noack VII, 15-. 9. 43, T31 /156 /06-; AOK 9 OQu / VII/
Qu., Evakuierung, 1. 10. 43, T31 /35 /9513; WiIn Mitte Chefgr. Arbeit, Aktennotiz für 
eine Besprechung des Inspekteurs mit der Heeresgruppe, . 9. 43, T /1100 /1104; Heeres-
gruppe Mitte OQu / Qu., Flüchtlingsbewegung, . 9. 43, T /1100 /109-91.
0 The codenames translate as ›Tortoise‹, ›Mole‹, ›Panther‹ and ›Bear Position‹.
1 WiIn Mitte, Protokoll über die Besprechung mit Chef WiStab Ost am 6. 3. 43, T /1099 /103; 
WiKdo Mogilew, Lage- und Tätigkeitsbericht Nr 16, 1. 4. 43, T /114 /34.
 OKH/GenStdH/Op.Abt. (I), Führerbefehl Nr. 10 (Ostwall), 1. . 43, IWM AL 1591.
3 WiIn Mitte I/Ia, Pantherstellung, 1. 9. 43, T /1101 /5.
4 Hgr Mitte OQu / Qu., Aufstellung von Zivilarbeitsdienstabteilungen (ZADA), . 11. 43, gez. 
Busch, T313 /305 /549; c. f. HeWiFü Mitte, Aktenvermerk über die Besprechung beim RK 
Ostland am 16. 1. 43, T /1101 /60.
5 KTB Korück 559 Qu, Dezember 1943, T501 /90 /4.
6 Tätigkeitsbericht AOK 9 OQu / Qu., 31. 1. 43; AWiFü AOK 9, Tätigkeitsbericht Nr 51 /43 
(30. 1. 43), T31 /35 /95313, 9513.
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staffwork of pioneer and logistics officers. LVI Panzer Corps, operating in the 
swampy Polesie region, received 3.54 labourers at its railhead at Zales’e in early Feb-
ruary 1944. Labourers were circulated between army sectors and maneuvered as if 
they were tactical reserves. On New Year’s Day, 1944, 3rd Panzer Army, fighting to 
defend Vitebsk on the northern flank of the army group, was informed that it would 
receive 00-1.000 labourers from 4th Army’s sector in the centre. The reinforcement 
was immediately committed to a threatened sector held by IX Corps.9 This followed 
a previous transport from Mogilev of 9 workers sent before Christmas. An addi-
tional 3.000 labourers were combed out from a refugee camp at Lesna in the GK 
Weissruthenien for the SS/Police battlegroups fighting on the panzer army’s left 
flank.30 In May 1944, 4th Army once again gave up .600 workers, this time to nd 
Army on the southern flank, which additionally received .000 labourers from 
Ukraine at the same time.31 By May 1944, 6.6 ZADAs had been mobilised.3 
400.000 of a rump population of 1,9 million in the zone of operations were engaged 
in nonagricultural work, of whom 300.000 performed directly military tasks in the 
ZADAs or supply services.33 On the eve of the Soviet summer offensive, the army 
group chief of staff Hans Krebs described the ZADAs as »organic components of the 
troops.« Their importance, he declared, was because »the struggle in the east is no 
longer to be fought without the use of civilian labourers.«34
The Refugee Crisis of 1943 /1944 and the Fate of ›Unwanted‹ Civilians
The arrival of German frontline divisions in the formerly westernmost region of the 
zone of operations in the autumn of 1943 thus initiated the same dynamic of agricul-
tural decline and proletarianisation of the rural population as had occurred in the 
Rzhev salient and east of Roslavl in the winter of 194 /3. Forced labour at the front 
entailed the removal of the greater part of the able-bodied workforce from agricul-
ture. Intensifying the labour shortage was an increased quota of 5.000 workers for 
the Sauckel Action. Through targeting partisan-controlled territory and ›recruiting‹ 
 AOK 9 APiFü, Tätigkeitsbericht . 3. 44, T31 /340 /9114.
 Korpsversorgungsstützpunkt Salessje, Wochenmeldung, 19. . 44, T314 /144 /4; KTB LVI. 
PzK Qu, -14. . 44, T314 /143 /0-9; LVI PzK, Wochenmeldung Korpsversorgungsstütz-
punkt, 1. . 44, T314 /1441 /.
9 Tätigkeitsbericht PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu/, 1. 1. 44, T313 /31 /595; Lagebericht AWiFü AOK 
4, 16. 1. 43-15. 1. 44, T /111 /9.
30 SSPF Weissruthenien, Beitreibung von Stellungsbaukräften, 5. 1. 44, NARB 30-1-10, pp.14-
15 (USHMM RG53.00M/16); Korück 559 Qu, 10-Tagesmeldung der Kommandanturen, 
0. 1. 43, T501 /90 /103; Tätigkeitsbericht PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu., 19. 1. 43, T313 / /5641-.
31 Monatsbericht Hgr Mitte OQu / Qu./VII (Mil.Verw) Mai, 1. 6. 44, T454 /104 /935; Lagebe-
richt HeWiFü Mitte April, 5. 5. 44, T /110 /451; AOK  OQu / Qu. (Kgf ), Beitrag zum 
Tätigkeitsbericht Monat Mai 1944, 10. 6. 44, T31 /156 /10-1.
3 Lagebericht HeWiFü Mitte Mai, 5. 6. 44, T /110 /56.
33 HeWiFü Mitte, Niederschrift über die Besprechungen mit Chef WiStab Ost am 19-0. Mai 
1944, T /110 /494.
34 Hgr Mitte OQu / Qu., Zivilarbeitsdienstabteilungen, 0. 5. 44, gez. Krebs, T31 /33 /91039.
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children under the age of 14, Army Group Centre actually exceeded this quota, sen-
ding .1 civilians to Germany in the first six months of 1944.35
Already in October 1943, a »severe shortage« of agricultural labourers was reported 
from the areas behind the frontline of 9th Army. The implementation of the ZADA 
action exacerbated this.36 4th Army’s Economics Leader reported a similar develop-
ment in its sector. »Through concentration in barracks, ration recipients are created 
from self-suppliers […] the rural population will however be slowly but surely deci-
mated and reduced in productivity.«3 In the rear, the depopulation of the ›twilight 
zones‹ and the emergence of a no man’s land between German and Soviet parti-
san-controlled areas compounded this loss of agricultural land. »The bandit border 
areas are denuded of people and livestock,” noted the Army Group Economics Lead-
er in January 1944.3 In the spring of 1944, a quarter of the total acreage in the zone of 
operations lay fallow. This was a result of the evacuation of the 5 km zone behind the 
front and the mobilisation of the 0 km zone for the ZADA action, as well as from 
losses to the partisans.39 Precise calculations by 4th Army indicated that ,9 % of the 
acreage in its rear area lay under the control of the partisans or abandoned.40 Fulfil-
ment of agricultural quotas for the 1943 /44 harvest year was accordingly dramatically 
under target, yet the quantities that were successfully requisitioned for the Wehr-
macht deprived the civilian population of potential food reserves. That winter, more 
potatoes, grain and meat was requisitioned from the 4 rayons of Army Group Cen-
tre’s zone of operations than from the 6 rayons of the GK Weissruthenien.41
The combined effects of the mobilisation of forced labour for the front, the mass 
round-ups of labour in the rear for the Sauckel Action, the intensification of antipar-
tisan warfare and the continued depradations of German requisitioning commandos 
sufficed to strip the entire zone of operations bare of the food and labour to sustain 
the existence of any civilian deemed unfit for work.4 Yet the number of Arbeitsun-
fähige had dramatically increased as a result of the repeated evacuations and popula-
tion displacements. »The severe regrouping of the population through the migration 
that has emerged because of the retreat and the Erfassungen,” 4th Army observed in 
December 1943, »has led to a deterioration of social relations. Stores could not be 
taken in most cases. The expected inadequate utilisation of large agricultural acreages 
as a consequence of the establishment of the ZADAs, as well as the limited possibility 
35 Lagebericht HeWiFü Mitte Juni 1944, 4. . 44, T /66 /116164; further details in Terry, 
German Army Group Centre (wie Anm. 15), pp. 9-36.
36 WiIn Mitte, Lagebericht Nr. 34, 31. 10. 43, T /1101 /506; AWiFü AOK 9/WiKdo 0 (Bobru-
isk), Lagebericht Nr 1 /44 Januar 1944, 3. 1. 44, T /103 /1164; Lagebericht HeWiFü Mitte 
Januar, 31. 1. 44, T /1101 /94.
3 Lagebericht AWiFü AOK 4, 16. 1. 43-15. 1. 44, 16.-15. 3. 44, T /111 /91, 101.
3 Lagebericht HeWiFü Mitte Januar, 31. 1. 44, T /1101 /93.
39 Lagebericht HeWiFü Mitte Mai, 5. 6. 44, T /110 /55.
40 Lagebericht AWiFü AOK 4, 16.5-15. 6. 44, T /111 /10.
41 HeWiFü Mitte Ia, Brief Reichsminister Rosenberg an Reichsmarschall, 9. 4. 44, NA T /110 /434.
4 HeWiFü Mitte, Aktenvermerk über Besprechung am 5. 1. 1943, T /1101 /631.
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of utilising the soil inside the Sperrzonen, will lead to a further worsening of living 
conditions.«43
Already in September 1943, the Chief of Economics Staff East, General Otto Stapf, 
had warned that »it must be clear to all that the return of the unfit costs us food.«44 
This description characterised the majority of the 1.000 evacuees from east of the 
Panther Line resettled in eastern Belorussia during the autumn of 1943. With the start 
of the winter battles along the Panther Line, these were now joined by tens of thou-
sands of fresh evacuees removed from the combat zone. As a result, the rear areas now 
filled up with an unbelievable concentration of refugees. The lucky ones were evacu-
ated to the rearward rayons of the Armeegebieten, where they might be able to find 
housing, food and work on the land, and so avoid either deportation to Germany or 
the front. In December 1943, 3.000 civilians were so resettled in Osipovichi, Kirov 
and Bobruisk rayons from the forward areas of LV Corps in 9th Army’s sector.45 Yet 
these designated reception areas soon filled up.
Compounding the overcrowding was the problem of what to do with civilians 
evacuated during major antipartisan operations from the partisan zones but later 
deemed unfit for work. In December 1943, 9th Army ordered the evacuation of its 
remaining foothold in Klichev rayon, expecting to harvest 1.100 labourers from this 
withdrawal. Examination of the 00 evacuees who had not run away found that only 
130 were fit for work; the rest were either children, their mothers or the elderly.46 
Orders issued by Kampfgruppe von Gottberg before Operation ›Kormoran‹ laid down 
that suspects found to be unfit for work were to be led back into ›closed zones‹ (Sper-
rgebiete) to avoid burdening the food supply.4 In the event, much of the sieving out 
had to be undertaken in reception camps. On June 1, the day before the start of the 
Soviet summer offensive, several thousand captives from ›Kormoran‹ were examined 
in Dulag 40 by a labour commission, of which 500 were combed out as fit for work. 
»Child-rich mothers«, numbering 1.500 with their offspring, were transported to Ba-
ranovichi, while »invalids and the sick« were to be returned to their villages.4 Partic-
ularly affected by this problem was the partisan-dominated rear area of 3rd Panzer 
Army. In January 1944, a transport of 900 »captured partisan helpers« rounded up 
during Operation ›Otto‹ by SS and Police forces arrived at Lepel; only 50 women 
were deemed able-bodied, the remainder were sent back.49 To cope with unwanted 
43 Lagebericht AOK 4 OQu / Qu./VII Dezember 1943, 3. 1. 44, T31 /41 /9596.
44 WiIn Mitte, Aktenvermerk über Dienstbesprechung aus Anlaß Besuch General der Infanterie 
Stapf am 16. 9. 43, T /1100 /1033.
45 Tätigkeitsbericht AOK 9 OQu / Qu., 13. 1. 43; Monatlicher Lagebericht AOK 9 OQu / Qu./
VII, Monatlicher Lagebericht, 4. 1. 44, NA 31 /35 /956, 9541.
46 AOK 9 OQu / AWiFü / VII/Qu., Räumung des Rayons Klitschew, 4. 1. 43; AWiFü AOK 9, 
Tätigkeitsbericht, 6. 1. 43; Tätigkeitsbericht AOK 9 OQu / Qu., 6. 1. 43, T31 /35 /9531, 
951, 95316.
4 Kampfgruppe von Gottberg, Erfassungsaktion, 4. 5. 44, T /110 /966-; FS VI AK Ia an 
Gruppe Kiesling, 5. 5. 44, T314 /335 /116.
4 WiKdo 13 (Borissow) Gruppe Arbeit, Wochenbericht 19-5. 6. 44, T /1146 /64.
49 Tätigkeitsbericht PzAOK 3 OQu / VII (Mil.Verw.), 5. 1. 44, . 1. 44, T313 /31 /5950-1, 594109-10.
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evacuees, the army ordered the creation of ›closed communities‹ (Sperrgemeinden) for 
Operation ›Frühlingsfest‹ in April 1944. These »had the purpose of accommodating 
the civilian population selected as unfit for work in closed quarters and separately 
from other civil persons.« The Sperrdörfer were then used to house evacuees from 
other areas. After the conclusion of ›Frühlingsfest‹, the German commandant in Ush-
achi reported that .000 refugees from Vitebsk and 500 from Orel had been resettled 
into the newly pacified areas.50 »Considerable parts of the rayons Beshenkovichi, 
Chashniki and Shumilino are heavily occupied by evacuees,« warned 3rd Panzer Army. 
»As a result there are not only food difficulties, but also difficulties in the division of 
land. The houses are often over-occupied and typhus infections are thereby not rare. 
As in this region the entire able-bodied population, as well as livestock and horses, 
have been taken out, only a fraction of the agriculturally useable area will be farmed.«51
The rear areas now had to support a population beyond that which could be sus-
tained from their declining agricultural resources. In early 1944, the civilian popula-
tion of 4th Army’s sector was estimated as 535.000, of whom 105.000 labourers and 
their dependants were entitled to civilian rations, while 30.000 ZADAs were fed from 
Wehrmacht stocks. 100.000 evacuees »without any economic basis« were registered 
in transit camps and reception areas.5 An average of 3-6.000 refugees burdened each 
rayon in the Armeegebiet. Some districts were even more overcrowded: in the five 
rayons of Tolochin, Krugloye, Cholopenichi, Krupka and Borisov, there were 50.000 
refugees.53 The majority were hemmed into a narrow strip of territory in between the 
so-called ›Bärenstellung‹ and ›Biberstellung‹ east of Mogilev and Orsha. Even the 
.000-strong civilian labour force engaged in constructing the two fallback posi-
tions could no longer be fed from local resources.54 By May, the 100.000 refugees 
were simply no longer being fed at all. The medium term prospects were even more 
bleak, as all agriculture had ceased in the area to the depth of 35 to 45 km behind the 
front.55 In April, the army in desperation ordered an ›Aktion zur Heranführung vers-
teckter Lebensmittel in Heimatgebieten evakuierter Flüchtlinge‹.This »self-help mea-
sure« entailed dispatching evacuees back to their home villages in the combat zone 
under guard, so that squirrelled food reserves could be dug up and distributed. Hopes 
that berry- and mushroom-picking could help bridge the burgeoning food deficit ran 
up against the total ban on all civilian movement ordered as a result of the partisan 
50 PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu., Sperrgemeinden, 15. 5. 44, gez. Heidkämper, T313 /31 /5991; Tätig-
keitsbericht PzAOK 3 OQu / VII (Mil.Verw.), 1. 6. 44, T313 /316 /5941.
51 Lagebericht AWiFü PzAOK 3, 16.5-15. 6. 44, T /119 /4.
5 Lagebericht AWiFü AOK 4, 16.3-15. 4. 44, T /111 /1041-.
53 HeWiFü Mitte Abt BB, KTB-Rückblick 1.1-31. 3. 44, T /110 /159; Lagebericht AOK 4 
OQu / VII März, . 4. 44, T31 /4 /9619-0.
54 Lagbericht AOK 4 OQu / VII Januar, 3. . 44; Februar, 3. 3. 44, T31 /41 /964-, 9653; 
Monatsbericht Hgr Mitte OQu / Qu./VII (Mil.Verw.) Dezember 1943, 11. 1. 44, p.4, T454 /164 
unpag.
55 HeWiFü Mitte, Niederschrift über die Besprechungen mit Chef WiStab Ost am 19-0. 5. 44, 
T /110 /506; Ord.Offz Chef WiStab Ost, Reisebericht über die Dienstreise Chef WiStab 
Ost zur Heeresgruppe Mitte und AOK , 1-1. 5. 44, T /109 /63.
194 
nicholas terry
situation. Only the decision in early June to permit food distributed to refugees to 
count against the quotas levied on the village collectives staved off complete starva-
tion before the start of the Soviet summer offensive.56
The refugee crisis was significantly exacerbated by the splitting-up of the nuclear 
family in the course of the conscription of able-bodied labourers. So far as was possi-
ble, it had been hitherto official policy to avoid the separation of families during 
evacuations. Exceptions to this rule had in fact occurred during the retreats of the 
autumn of 1943, but were seen as »contrary to plan.«5 The introduction of the ZADA 
system changed all this. The regimentation of the able-bodied population into labour 
detachments meant that they became separated from their dependants, often being 
sent hundreds of miles away from their relatives and homes.5 Though thousands of 
women were now drafted into the ZADAs or otherwise employed in the rear areas, 
little effort was made for the provision of childcare or even for the continuation of 
schooling. Indeed, the age of a family’s children often determined the fate of the 
mother and father. If the children were aged between ten and 14, the family might 
well be deemed »capable of work in Germany« (Reichseinsatzfähig), and would be 
deported out of the zone of operations. If the children were aged between five and 
ten, the family would remain in the Armeegebieten; urban families might be lucky 
enough to find access to a kindergarten so the mother could return to work and 
thereby receive more food rations; rural families were in danger of resettlement into 
a ›reception area‹. Most at risk were mothers with very young children who could 
scarcely take up any kind of work at all. The proportion of such families was high. In 
March 1944, of 3.01 inhabitants of Osipovichi rayon, 3.416 were under three years 
of age. 9, % of the population had thus been born under the occupation.59
Hitherto, Army Group Centre had been able to rely on the Reichskommissariat 
Ostland as its dumping-ground for unwanted civilians. The evacuations of the au-
tumn and winter of 1943, however, overwhelmed the capacity of the region under 
civilian administration to accommodate refugees, especially as the RK Ostland was 
also the reception area for all evacuees from Army Group North. In December, the 
Economics Staff East and the Quartermaster-General tried in vain to persuade the 
Government-General in Poland to take in 50-100.000 evacuees from the two army 
groups.60 The traditional reception area for Army Group Centre, the GK Weissruthe-
nien, was now »flooded« with refugees. »The available reception camps are massively 
overflowing with 36.000 people,« complained the Generalkommissar, Curt von Gott-
berg, in November 1943. »Around 300 to 400.000 refugees find themselves on the 
56 Lageberichte AOK 4 OQu / VII März-April 1944, T31 /4 /960, 904; Lagebericht 
AWiFü AOK 4 16.5-15. 6. 44, T /111 /105-6.
5 Tätigkeitsbericht PzAOK 3 O.Qu./Qu. , 5. 10. 43, NOKW-36.
5 See the regulations in Hgr Mitte OQu / Qu., Aufstellung von Zivilarbeitsdienstabteilungen 
(ZADA), . 11. 43, T313 /305 /549.
59 Otchet po Osipovichskomu raionu, 3.1944, NARB Mogilev 45-1-1, p.4R (USHMM 
RG53.00M/3).
60 WiStab Ost Chefgr Arbeit, KTB-Beitrag 11-1. 1. 43, T /1091 /160-1.
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roads; there a nameless suffering holds sway.«61 The refugee camp at Alytus in Lithu-
ania was similarly overflowing, and suffered from appalling hygienic conditions, food 
shortages, and eventually mass starvation.6 In the last two months of 1943, Soviet 
offensives forced a new round of evacuations from the city of Vitebsk, which soon lay 
under Russian bombardment. In November and December, some 9.000 inhabitants 
of Vitebsk and of the threatened frontline areas were evacuated, initially to the Lesna 
camp near Baranovichi, later to Alytus (Olita) in Lithuania.63 At the same time, 4th 
Army sought to reduce the populations of the major towns in its rear area. 1.000 
civilians from the cities of Mogilev, Orsha and Borisov were evacuated, the majority 
by train to Lesna, Alytus, Vilnius and Bialystok.64 A total of 166.91 refugees and 
evacuees out of the Army Group Centre zone of operations were recorded in Novem-
ber and December, 9.196 to GK Weissruthenien, 30.000 to Lithuania, Latvia and 
Ukraine and 3.3 as Ostarbeiter to Germany.65 With these resettlements, a limit 
had been reached. All evacuations were ordered halted at the end of December 1943. 
The transit camps in the GK Weissruthenien were to be dissolved and the region 
closed to further resettlement.66
The New Doctrinal Response: Ozarichi and ›Himmelfahrt‹
Faced with a progressively worsening refugee crisis, at the turn of 1943 /4, increasingly 
radical suggestions concerning the fate of the Arbeitsunfähigen were now proposed. 
At a conference between officials of the RK Ostland and Army Group Centre on 
December 16, the army group’s Qu., Lieutenant-Colonel Schettler, announced that 
»the army group will take a fundamentally new path with evacuations. Only that part 
of the population that is valuable for the German economy will be brought back.«6 
Two days before the end of 1943, the army group’s labour chief, Franz Gelberg, ob-
served that »the suggestion to leave behind unfit people to the enemy was hitherto 
61 RMO II 1c, Vermerk über die Besprechungen mit SS-Gruf. von Gottberg am -3. 11. 43, 
T454 /3 /46-.
6 PzAOK3 Qu./Qu./VII, Abtransport von Zivilisten aus dem Armeebereich, . 1. 1943, 
T454 / /0-10. A comprehensive overview of Alytus can be found in Christoph Dieck-
mann, Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Litauen 1941-1944, Göttingen 011, pp. 13-1391, who 
estimates that up to 35.000 evacuees died there.
63 WiKo 06 (Witebsk), KTB-Beitrag der Gruppe Arbeit, 15.11-5. 1. 43, 0-31. 1. 43, 
T /1141 /65-, 0-1; Lagebericht PzAOK 3 OQu / VII (Mil.Verw.) Dezember 1943, 4. 1. 44, 
T313 /316 /59415-3; Lageberichte AWiFü PzAOK 3 16.10-15. 1. 43, T /11 /65, 3-4.
64 KTB Korück 559 Qu, Dezember 1943; Korück 559 Qu, 10-Tagesmeldung der Kommandantu-
ren, 0. 1. 43; 30. 1. 43, T501 /90 /4, 103-41; Lagebericht AOK 4 OQu / Qu..VII Dezember 
43, 3. 1. 44, T31 /41 /959.
65 HeWiFü Mitte Abt. Arbeit, KTB-Rückblick November und Dezember, T /1101 /66-.
66 Monatsbericht Hgr Mitte OQu / Qu./VII (Mil.Verw.) Dezember 1943, 11. 1. 44, p.4, T454 /164 
unpag.; Lagebericht AOK 4 OQu / Qu./VII Dezember 1943, 3. 1. 44, T31 /41 /959; 
WiStab Ost Chefgr Arbeit, KTB-Beitrag -14. 1. 44, T /1091 /996.
6 HeWiFü Mitte, Aktenvermerk über die Besprechung beim RK Ostland am 16. 1. 43, 
T /1101 /60.
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rejected by the army group.«6 Yet all four armies under the command of Army Group 
Centre now suggested precisely such a measure. »As far as the bringing back of the 
civilian population is concerned,« so the army group’s quartermaster Colonel von 
Unold told a conference in Minsk two months later, »all armies have spoken out 
against the withdrawal of people unfit for labour. Reason: availability of food and 
shelter.«69 As the labour department of WiKdo Borissow suggested, »If their accomo-
dation in the previous settlement region is not possible, after examination of the 
military assumptions, reception areas must be established in isolated regions that in 
the case of a rearward movement can be left to the enemy.«0 One solution contemp-
lated by 4th Army was to create so-called ›women’s villages‹ (Frauendörfer):
To make the harshness of evacuation and the tearing apart of families more bear-
able, it is suggested that in tactically irrelevant areas ›women’s villages‹ are created. 
These villages are to be filled in the vicinity of the front with those parts of the 
population incapable of military service and uninteresting from a labour deploy-
ment perspective, that can then in the case of a backwards movement be left to the 
enemy. To relieve supplies, these women’s villages must be bequeathed primitive 
economic possibilities.1
A similar arrangement was proposed by 3rd Panzer Army. Exasperated by the difficul-
ties of resettling 1.500 evacues from the sector of 14th Infantry Division in December 
1943, the army’s Qu. officer Lieutenant Dr. Westerkamp resolved that »in future to 
deport arbeitsunfähige civilians over the front, as an evacuation of all civilians out of 
the areas close to the front must lead to incalculable consequences in the long run.« 
In January 1944, in an order signed by Colonel-General Reinhardt, Westerkamp put 
the following words into the mouth of his commander-in-chief:3
In situations as of late, it is intolerable that time and effort are squandered on 
the withdrawal of great masses of the population that represent only a burden as 
mouths to feed … to be sure, it is forbidden to send the civilian population over 
to the enemy side, but it is perfectly conceivable to imagine situations in which the 
course of fighting demands particular decisions from the divisions on their own 
authority. Things could for example be such, that no other choice remains but 
to concentrate the civilian population in good time in particular localities, where 
they do not burden military operations or the lines of communications, and where 
6 HeWiFü Mitte, Aktenvermerk über Besprechung am 9. 1. 1943, T /1101 /633.
69 HeWiFü Mitte Abt I/Rü, Aktennotiz über die Besprechung von General Nagel am . . 44 
in Minsk, T /1101 /1046.
0 WiKdo 13 (Borissow) Gruppe Arbeit, Evakuierungsmassnahmen, . 1. 43, T /111 /933.
1 Lagbericht AWiFü AOK 4 16.11-15. 1. 43, T /111 /944.
 Tätigkeitsbericht PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu., 1. 1. 43, T313 / /5644.
3 Der OB der 3. Panzerarmee OQu / Qu., Zivilbevölkerung bei Absetzbewegungen, . 1. 44; 
PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu., Zivilbevölkerung, 1. . 44, NOKW-64 and -44, also 
T313 /31 /59-3, 5996-.
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finally they must perforce be left behind, but only after the arbeitsfähige male and 
female population have been carried off for German service.
nd Army, too, saw things almost identically. The Economics Leader’s Labour Depart-
ment proposed the following:4
Problem: where should the women with children and the elderly, left behind after 
the extraction of the reichseinsatzfähig families and the Wehr- and Arbeitsfähigen, 
remain? The troops want to keep the villages completely free of civilians. Yet dif-
ficulties with food, shelter and disease prevention arise from resettlement. Sugges-
tion: settlement of the remnant families in localities that in the foreseeable future 
in all probability will be abandoned without fighting to the enemy.
In mid-February, 9th Army issued a summary order concerning the evacuation, regis-
tration and deployment of civilians, replacing no less than twelve orders on these 
themes issued in the previous three months. Signed by the army commander General 
Josef Harpe, the preamble to the directive offered the following slogans and precepts 
to the German commanders and troops:5
»Deny all labourers and military age males to the Red Army!
Supply one’s own army with a great many labourers !
Leave behind for the Red Army a great many mouths (women with many small 
children, children and elderly)!
Do not burden one’s own army and its hinterland with unneeded mouths !
Memoranda and orders such as these provided the backdrop and justification for the 
evacuation in mid-March 1944 near the town of Ozarichi in the Polesie oblast of 
Belorussia. Ozarichi lay inside the so-called ›wet triangle‹ of swampland in the Polesie, 
a sector which had been defended since the autumn of 1943 by LVI Panzer Corps, 
initially under the command of nd Army, later under that of 9th Army.6 The fighting 
generated thousands of refugees, all of whom remained inside the corps rear area. 
During December 1943, a breach was created on the seam between nd and 9th Armies 
which was only closed at the very end of the year by a counterattack mounted by 16th 
Panzer Division. 10.000 civilians fled eastwards through the so-called ›Rudobelka 
Gate‹ to join the Soviet 65th Army under General Batov.9 In early 1944, forces of the 
4 AWiFü AOK  Sachgebiet Arbeit, Notiz für Vortrag beim Chef, 4. . 44; see also the similar 
analysis in AWiFü AOK  Ref. La an OQu / Qu., 5. . 44, T /1111 /5-3.
5 AOK 9 OQu / Qu., Zusammenfassung der grundlegenden Bestimmungen über Evakuie-
rung / Erfassung von Arbeitskräften / Einsatz der Arbeitskräfte, 1. . 44, gez. Harpe, 
T314 /1441 /144-151, as in original.
6 Fighting around Parichi at the turn of the year, one formation nicknamed itself the ›forest 
and swamp division‹: Werner Haupt, Geschichte der 134. Infanterie-Division, Bad Kreuz-
nach 191, p. 06.
 KTB LVI. Pz.K Qu., 5. 1. 43, 14. 1. 44, 0. 1. 44, T314 /143 /3, 60, 66.
 Hgr Mitte Ia, Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung der Chefs der Generalstäbe der Armeen 
am 1. 1. 43, T31 /39 /900530 ff.; AWiFü AOK , Lagebericht Nr. 1, 3. 1. 44, T /1111 /644.
9 V. I. Kozlov, Kommunisty – organisatory partizanskoi borby v minskoi oblasti, in: Nepoko-
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Soviet Belorussian Front under Marshal Rokossovsky launched several major offen-
sives against the south flank of Army Group Centre, notably the Kalinkovichi-Mosyr 
offensive (January -30) and the Rogachev-Shlobin offensive (February 1-6), both 
of which forced withdrawals from German bridgeheads in Mozyr and Rogachev.0
To this military pressure was added the effects of the largest typhus epidemic to 
affect Belorussia during the Second World War. During the winter, infection rates 
from typhus increased as an inevitable result of the cold weather; civilians and sol-
diers simply spent more time indoors, in close physical proximity, providing a lethal 
breeding-ground for the lice which spread the disease. The churning of the civilian 
population, and the near-famine among refugees, further created almost ideal condi-
tions for a major outbreak. In the autumn of 1943, isolated incidents took place 
where typhus sufferers were simply shot by German troops or police, as occurred in 
a village near Lida, when ten evacuees from Kalinin oblast in Russia were executed for 
displaying signs of infection.1 More common were sharp orders to implement a sani-
tary apartheid between the troops and the population.
Despite such precautions, the epidemic began around the turn of the year. In the 
Polesie region held by nd Army, by December 1943, there were soon pockets of cases 
in villages northeast of Kalinkovichi housing evacuees from the combat zone. Worst 
affected was Lunin, where evacuees from Smolensk had been transported to work as 
forced labourers for the Organisation Todt. The source of infection was identified as 
three transports of .6 evacuees from the refugee camps in Lesna and Mogilev. 
Thirty died in transit, while almost 40 % of the deportees were adjudged incapable of 
work after their arrival. Before the arrival of the transports, there were already 69 ca-
ses; a month later, 10 cases; by the end of February 1944, 333 cases.3 A further 166 
cases were recorded in Lakhva at the same time. The disease then spread to German 
troops, infecting 1.306 soldiers of nd Army during February and a further 43 in 
March.4 The parlous state of civil medical services prevented the army from gauging 
the extent of the epidemic among the population until May, by which time the worst 
was largely over. Even in this month, over a thousand new cases were reported. Lunin 
rennaia Belarussia: Vospominaniia i statii o vsenarodnom partizanskom dvizhenii v Belorusii 
v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg). Moscow 1963, p. 50; XLI PzK, Bewirt-
schaftung des Korpsgebietes, 14. . 44, T314 /90 /1.
0 These offensives cost Rokossovsky’s forces .434 casualties. Gurkin, Liudskie poteri (wie 
Anm. 3), p. .
1 Akt, 1. . 44, Lida, NARB 45-1-, p. 9 (USHMM RG53.00M/5).
 Der Oberbefehlshaber der 9. Armee / IVb, 15. 1. 43, T314 /90 /0.
3 HeWiFü Mitte Abt. Arbeit, Abschriftlicher Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die Dienstreise 
des MVR Kunert nach Pinsk und Bobruisk am 13.-16. 1. 44, T /110 /. Further details can 
be found in AOK  IVb, Lage- und Tätigkeitsbericht Februar 1944, T31 /1 /45 ff.; Lagebe-
richt AOK  OQu / VII (Mil.Verw.) Dezember 1943, . 1. 44, Januar, 30. 1. 44, T31 /16 /531-3, 
959-60; Tätigkeitsbericht AOK  OQu / Qu., Woche 4-31. 1. 43, T31 /11 /11; AWiFü 
AOK , Lagebericht Nr. 1, 3. . 44, EC-46, also T /1111 /650-1; Lagebericht HeWiFü Mit-
te Februar 1944, T /1101 /99.
4 Lage- und Tätigkeitsberichte Armeearzt AOK  Februar, März 1944, T31 /1 /45-, 44-9.
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remained under quarantine from German troops well into April.5 By early March, 
the epidemic had jumped across the frontline: two corps of the Soviet 65th Army were 
infected with typhus. Across the whole of liberated Belorussia, 4.000 cases of typhus 
were registered during the first half of 1944.6
Behind the German lines, the disease similarly spread northwards, into the sectors 
of 4th and 9th Armies, and westwards, into the GK Weissruthenien. From February, 
4th Army reported that typhus was »widespread«; the following month, it noted a 
»growth in typhus cases, above all in those parts of Belynichi rayon overcrowded with 
refugees.« By April, the army was reporting around 1.300 new cases, »primarily caused 
by refugees.« From January to May, the German troops of XXXIX Panzer Corps 
incurred 14 cases of typhus; a further 04 civilians in the sector of the 33th Infantry 
Division fell sick with the disease in February and March. The neighbouring 34nd 
Division established a »sickness village« (Krankendorf) in its rear to accommodate 
typhus sufferers.9 9th Army suffered heavily from the outbreak; from an unseasonal 
low of only 6 cases among the civilian population in December 1943, the epidemic 
grew to infect 39 soldiers in just one fortnight as late as May 1944.90 Precisely how 
many civilians succumbed to the disease between these two dates is unclear. In Ro-
gachev, abandoned by the Germans at the end of February, over 1,00 patients sick 
with typhus were left behind by the retreat of 9th Army’s forces.91 At the same time, 
the army imposed a total ban on all civilian movement in the combat zone to prevent 
the spread of the epidemic. Anyone caught outside their home villages was to be sent 
to the nearest POW camp.9
Compounding the problem were growing food shortages and a general overcrow-
ding of the forward areas. At the start of 1944, the four infantry divisions of XX 
Corps, then fighting around Kalinkovichi in the sector of nd Army, had to feed well 
5 Lagebericht AOK  OQu / VII (Mil.Verw.) Mai, 31. 5. 44, T31 /1305 /15; Tätigkeitsbericht AOK 
 OQu / Qu., 4. 4. 44, T31 /130 /151.
6 P. I. Batov, V pokhodakh i boyakh, Moscow 196, p.5; Zalozhniki vermakhta (wie Anm. 6), 
p. 1.
 Gebietskommissar Glebokie, Lagebericht für die Monate Dezember 1943, Januar, Februar u. 
März 1944, . 3. 44; Gebietskommissar Hansewitsche, Lagebericht für das erste Vierteljahr 
1944, 4. 4. 44, T454 / /1459, 1444.
 AOK 4 OQu / VII, Lageberichte Februar-April 1944, T31 /41 /96533, T31 /4 /960-1, 
904.
9 Korpsarzt XXXIX PzK, Tätigkeitsbericht 1.1-30. 6. 44; Zustandsbericht auf dem San-Gebiet 
der 33. Inf.Div. März 1944; über die 34. Inf.Div. vom 1-6. 1. 44, 1-6. . 44, T314 /953 /39, 
66, 501, 59.
90 Monatlicher Lagebericht AOK 9 OQu / VII, 4. 1. 44, T31 /35 /9541; AOK 9 Ia, Bespre-
chung des Kommandierenden Generals am 6. 5. 44, T31 /33 /91146.
91 AWiFü AOK , Notiz über Besprechungen beim HeWiFü Mitte in Borissow am -. März 
anlässlich der Anwesenheit des Generals d. Inf. Stapf, 15. 3. 44, T /1111 /; AOK 9 
OQu / Qu., Erfahrungsbericht über den Abschub nichtarbeitsfähiger Zivilisten zum Feind, 
. 3. 44, T31 /33 /910313.
9 AOK 9 Ia / OQu / Qu., Verbot des Verkehrs der Zivilbevölkerung im Gefechtsgebiet, 15. . 44, 
gez. Harpe, T31 /33 /910331.
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over 1.000 civilians in their combat zones, of whom 4.650 were evacuees and only 
1.33 were fit for work. Food could be supplied to the trench-diggers, but not to the 
remaining population. In the corps rear area, the commandant of Mozyr had virtually 
no food stocks to feed the .300 inhabitants of the town, who included 1.100 child-
ren, 1.000 women and just 00 men.93 Most of the population had been resettled into 
the combat zone from evacuated areas further east, and the able-bodied combed out 
for the Reichseinsatz. The standing directives laid down by ›Führer Order No. ‹ to 
evacuate a 0 km zone now threatened to tip the forward areas over into crisis. »A 
sudden increase in population density in this part of the army zone, as is conditional 
on the immediate evacuation of the 0 km zone, brings with it the danger of a fami-
ne among the civilian population,” warned nd Army.94
At the very end of December 1943, LVI Panzer Corps was refused permission to 
evacuate over 6.000 civilians to Luniniec in the rear area of nd Army, as a preventati-
ve measure against the spread of typhus and because of the food shortage.95 The corps 
was forced to shuffle contingents of 1.000 civilians between its divisional sectors in 
order to accommodate the growing number of displaced persons. To the north, the 
neighbouring XLI Panzer Corps complained of the »unbearable accumulation of the 
civilian population« and of the »extraordinary burdening of accomodation possibili-
ties for the troops« because of the evacuees.96 In January 1944, 9th Army predicted that 
food stocks for the 3.000 evacuees in its rear area would not last through to the 
spring. An audit conducted in February revealed that available stocks of grain would 
run out in Zhlobin and Parichi by the end of March, while the supply of potatoes for 
the civilian population would be exhausted by the end of May, long before the new 
harvest. The rear areas of XLI and LVI Panzer Corps were regarded as »crisis areas … 
where great masses of people have gathered.« Conditions were so poor in the region 
of Zhlobin, that Soviet partisan units had supposedly forced over 5,000 elderly peo-
ple and children to leave the partisan zones, burdening the German-controlled villa-
ges and towns with further »unpopular natives« (missliebigen Einheimischen)9 An 
estimated 90.000 refugees crowded out the forward corps areas of 4th and 9th Armies.9 
Permission was forthcoming only in exceptional circumstances to evacuate refugees 
to the Armeegebieten, already overburdened by several hundred thousand displaced 
93 AWiFü AOK  Sachgeb. BB, Aktennotiz über die Verpflegung und Versorgung der Zivilbe-
völkerung, insbesondere der Evakuierten im Gebiet des XX. A. K. und der Korps-Abt. E , 
4.-9. 1. 44, T /1111 /613-5.
94 Der Oberbefehlshaber der . Armee, Evakuierung, 1. 1. 44, gez. Weiss, T31 /16 /54-3.
95 KTB LVI. Pz. Korps Qu., 5. 1. 4, . 1. 43, 0. 1. 44, T314 /143 /3, 40, 66.
96 XLI. Pz.K. Qu, Bewirtschaftung des Korpsgebietes, 14. . 44, T314 /90 /1.
9 Monatlicher Lagebericht AOK 9 OQu / Qu./VII, 4. 1. 43, T31 /35 /95413; AWiFü AOK 9, 
Lagebericht Nr  /44, 3. . 44, Nr 3 /44, . 3. 44, T /103 /140, 1153; HeWiFü Mitte Abt BB, 
KTB-Rückblick 1.1-31. 3. 44, T /110 /159-60.
9 Ord.Offz Chef WiStab Ost, Reisebericht über die Dienstreise Chef WiStab Ost zum HeWi-
Fü Mitte, WwiKdo Reval, WiIn Nord und WwiIn Ostland vom -11. 3. 44, T /1091 /119; 
HeWiFü Mitte, Aktenvermerk über Besprechungen anlässlich des Besuches Chef WiStab Ost 
am . 3. 44, T /1101 /10.
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civilians. In early March, XLI Panzer Corps secured authorisation from 9th Army to 
evacuate 1.500 civilians by rail out of its corps area, yet within five days, this conces-
sion was cancelled.99
The reasons for this cancellation can be deduced from the following analysis by 9th 
Army of the situation in March 1944 resulting from the cumulative effects of overc-
rowding, food shortages and epidemics:
Through the withdrawal of natives in the course of the defensive battles west of 
the Panther Line and the evacuation of the 5 km zone, an ever greater compression 
of the population emerged in the rear of the combat zone. The emergence of ty-
phus epidemic centres and the necessity of bringing food to already overpopulated 
settlements in order to secure the feeding of their inhabitants, urgently demanded 
the deportation of a part of this population, in particular because of the forth-
coming evacuation of the 0 km zone. As the army group declared itself unable to 
make available reception areas for the .000 civilians due to be evacuated, and 
furthermore forbade any evacuation movement, the army command decided to 
deport civilians unfit for work (sick, cripples, elderly, mothers with more than two 
children under ten and other Arbeitsunfähige) to the enemy.«100
On March 9, a conference of all corps and division quartermasters was convened by 
the Chief of Staff of 9th Army, to which the Army Economics Leader, Transport Of-
ficer and the commander of Sonderkommando a were also invited. The subject 
under discussion was the deportation of »around 0.000 civilians unfit for work« to 
the enemy, which was to take place in the sector of LVI Panzer Corps.101 In the pre-
ceding two days, both the commander in chief of 9th Army, General Josef Harpe, and 
the chief of staff of Army Group Centre, Lieutenant-General Hans Krebs, had visited 
the headquarters of LVI Panzer Corps to discuss the operation with the corps com-
mander, General Friedrich Hossbach.10 The order for the expulsion was issued im-
mediately after the conference; it was to be destroyed after the completion of the 
action. No copy of it survives in the files of either LVI Panzer Corps or 9th Army.103
The evacuation affected the frontline areas along the entire length of 9th Army’s 
sector. Evacuees from XXXV and LV Corps on the left flank of the army were to be 
transported by train southwards to LVI Panzer Corps’ railheads at Rudobelka, Poross-
lishche und Mikul Gorodok. By contrast, those evacuated from XLI and LVI Panzer 
Corps were to be moved by truck and footmarch.104 The army rear area, however, 
99 KTB XLI. Pz.K. Qu., 3. 3. 44, T314 /91 /111.
100 AOK 9 OQu / Qu., Erfahrungsbericht über den Abschub nichtarbeitsfähiger Zivilisten zum 
Feind, . 3. 44, T31 /33 /910313.
101 Op.cit.; KTB LVI. Pz.K. Qu., 9. 3. 44, T314 /143 /914-6; KTB XLI. Pz.K. Qu., 9. 3. 44, 
T314 /91 /1114.
10 Ferngespräche LVI PzK Ia, -. 3. 44, T314 /1436 /1049-50; KTB AOK 9 Ia, . 3. 44, 
T31 /333 /904.
103 According to KTB LVI Pz K Qu, 9. 3. 44, T314 /143 /914, the order – AOK 9 Ia / OQu / Qu. 
Nr 3 /44 g.Kdos, 9. 3. 44 – was destroyed on March 1, 1944.
104 Sonderkommando a, Auflockerung der Gefechtsgebiete, . 3. 44, T314 /1440 /90-1.
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remained outside the scope of the operation: the rayon of Osipovichi was completely 
unaffected by the comb-out of Arbeitsunfähigen.105 The action began on March 1: in 
Zhlobin, German soldiers went from house to house shouting »evacuation, evacuati-
on« and gave the entire population of the town three hours to gather their belongings. 
A sortirovka – selection – was conducted outside the town commandants’ office.106 
The first transports arrived on March 13. By then, the three camps had already recei-
ved ,100 civilians from LVI Corps’ rear and ,00 from XLI Corps.10
Preparations for the reception of the deportees had begun immediately after the 
order for the evacuation had been issued on March 9.10 On March 11, thirteen of-
ficers and officials of LVI Panzer Corps and its subordinate divisions, as well as SS-
Sturmbannführer Loos, commander of Sonderkommando a, met at the headquarters 
of the 35th Infantry Division to discuss the deportation. Hossbach ordered that the 
›final camps‹ into which the evacuees would be driven were to be located inside fo-
rests and camouflaged so as to hide the operation from Soviet aerial reconnaissence. 
Three such camps were to be set up behind the frontlines of (from north to south) 
the 19th, 35th and 110th Infantry Divisions. The camp set up by the 35th Division 
measured no more than 500 by 600 metres. The surrounding woods were to be hea-
vily mined, and the deportees warned that »every step to the west or the south means 
mines or fire.« Casualties among the evacuees were fully expected:
Spades are where possible to be given to the civilians
a) to be able to dig in somewhat in the event of enemy fire
b) on hygienic grounds because of the accruing corpses109
Shortly after the arrival of the first transports from the north on March 13, the chief 
of staff of LVI Panzer Corps was informed by 9th Army’s operations officer to expect 
»significantly more civilians« to arrive. In fact, the number was to double. A total of 
eight transports arrived on March 13, 14 and 15. From the reception camps at the 
corps railheads, the deportees were marched by foot over 35 km in the snow. By 
March 16, the evacuation was complete. The SD reported that 46.003 civilians, in-
cluding an estimated 6.500 small children, had been placed in the three ›final camps‹. 
53 evacuees died on the train transports, footmarches and inside the camps up to 
this time. A further 91 civilians were selected as labourers or men of military age 
105 Nachal’nik Ospivichskogo Raiona, Otchet po Osipovichskomu raionu za mart mesiat 1944 
g, pp. -3, NARB Mogilev 45-1-1 (USHMM RG 53.006M/5).
106 Protokol sudevnogo zasedaniia 1. 1. 4 goda, Gomel, NARB Gomel 1345--, pp. -33 
(USHMM RG 53.006M/1); Akt 3. 11. 44, Zhlobin, NARB 61-1-6, p.16 (USHMM RG 
53.00M/).
10 Ferngespräche LVI PzK Ia, 1-13. 3. 44, T314 /1436 /1055-6.
10 Just after midnight on 9 /10. 3. 44, the quartermaster and pioneer leader of 9th Army spoke by 
telephone: »barbed wire for divs. LVI PzK sufficient«. AOK 9 APiFü, Tätigkeitsbericht 
9. 3. 44, T31 /340 /910.
109 KTB LVI PzK Ia, 11. 3. 44, T314 /1435 /3; Besprechung auf dem Gefechtsstand der 35. ID in 
Grabje am 11. 3. 44, T314 /1436 /50-51 (citations); SK a, Auflockerung der Gefechtsgebiete, 
. 3. 44, T314 /1440 /93.
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prior to their arrival in the end-camps in a final sieving by commissions of German 
military doctors. Officially, the deportees were furnished with food for three days.110 
In practice, many received nothing at all to eat. In the night of March 16 /1, the three 
infantry divisions of LVI Panzer Corps withdrew behind the three camps, leaving 
light rearguards behind in the corps’ old positions. 39.59 civilians, »plus an estimated 
many thousand small children« were officially reported as »dropped off towards the 
enemy.« Amazingly, Soviet forces barely even probed the LVI Panzer Corps sector the 
next day. It was not until the night of March 1 /19 that troops of General Batov’s 65th 
Army entered the camp and discovered the refugees.111
Officially, Soviet forces liberated 33.40 civilians including 15.960 children under 
the age of 13. At least 900 bodies were found on the sites of the three camps.11 Accor-
ding to one survivor, Lidia Bykova, the dead were »stacked like firewood«. Soviet 
prosecutors at both the main Nuremberg trial and in war crimes trials in Belorussia 
subsequently gave conflicting figures of the total death toll at Ozarichi.113 All indica-
tors are, however, that a simple subtraction of the Soviet figures from the German 
claims to produce a possible death toll of 1.000 is inaccurate. German aerial recon-
naissance determined that by March 1, columns of civilians had fled the camps to 
the northeast and east; presumably, it was these fleeing civilians who alerted Soviet 
troops to the presence of an even greater number of sick, elderly and immobile in the 
camps.114 Nevertheless, a cautious estimate of the number of Belorussians who died 
on the way or in the Ozarichi camps during the seven days of their existence would 
amount to at least .000 people.
The consequences of Ozarichi were many and far-reaching. 3rd Panzer Army was 
informed of the deportation by the army group the day after the completion of the 
operation, on March 1.115 The after-action reports written by Sonderkommando a 
and 9th Army’s quartermaster were subsequently circulated around the army group 
and later submitted to OKH in April. The practical consequences began to be felt 
within a week of the Ozarichi deportation, as German commanders lost their few 
remaining inhibitions concerning the mass concentration and deportation of civili-
ans.116 In the course of the construction of Bobruisk as a so-called ›fortified place‹ 
110 Ferngespräche LVI PzK Ia, 13. 3. 44, T314 /1436 /1056; SK a, Auflockerung der Gefechtsgebie-
te, . 3. 44, T314 /1440 /90-1.
111 LVI Pz K Ia, Tagesmeldung an AOK 9, 1. 3. 44, T314 /1435 /0; AOK 9 Ia, Tagesmeldungen 
der Korps, 1. 3. 44, T31 /334 /9051; Batov, V pokhodakh i boyakh (wie Anm. 6), pp. 5-
60.
11 op.cit, pp. 61-5; Zalozhniki vermakhta (wie Anm. 6), pp. 10-1.
113 Protokol sudevnogo zasedaniia 1. 1. 4, Gomel, NARB Gomel 1345--, pp.-33 (USHMM 
RG 53.006M/1). See also Nuremberg document USSR-, available in a word for word Eng-
lish translation in the May edition of Soviet War News.
114 KTB AOK 9 Ia, 1. 3. 44, T31 /333 /9044.
115 Tätigkeitsbericht PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu., 1. 3. 44, T313 /31 /59654.
116 The report, Hgr Mitte OQu / Qu. Nr 46 /44 geh, 3. 4. 44, is seemingly lost. See Monats-
bericht Hgr Mitte OQu / Qu..VII (Mil.-Verw.) März, 1. 4. 44, p. 6, T454 /156, File EAP 
99 /49 unpag. The report was registered as received in HeWiFü Mitte Abt Arbeit, KTB-
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(Fester Platz), 9th Army ordered »the reconnaissence of a piece of land camouflaged 
from aerial observation and suitable for a civilian camp with a capacity of 0-30.000 
people« to the west of the city.11 A holding camp similar to this concept was later 
constructed to the west of Mogilev by 4th Army. In late April, 4th Army’s quartermas-
ter asked XXXIX Panzer Corps whether it could accommodate 14.000 Arbeitsunfähi-
ge in its rear area; the corps flatly refused.11 Despite this refusal, new standing orders 
issued by the same corps in May required that all Arbeitsunfähige be left behind du-
ring retreats: »Principle: no total evacuation! Deny the enemy all military-age and 
able-bodied people and engage them to strengthen our own combat power. On the 
other hand leave useless mouths to the enemy.« Word for word, this was identical to 
a general standing order issued by the army group in April.119 Eventually, XXXIX 
Corps was forced to accept 6.000 evacuees from Mogilev and Gorki in early June. 
The Arbeitsunfähige were concentrated east of the Dnieper but outside the Shklov 
bridgehead in the corps rear area.10 Major-General von Tresckow, one of the driving 
forces behind the German military opposition to Hitler, authorised and signed a si-
milarly identical order to nd Army prohibiting the evacuation of Arbeitsunfähige in 
late May. Those unfit for work (and now, those deemed unfit for evacuation) were 
to be confined to the 0 km zone, where they could most easily be dispensed with in 
the event of a retreat.11
In 3rd Panzer Army’s sector, the Ozarichi deportation coincided with the evacuati-
on of the remaining ablebodied population of Vitebsk. Though the city had already 
undergone one mass evacuation in November 1943, at the turn of the year, there were 
still 19.000 civilians in the city, including 6.500 children under 15, a number which 
continually threatened to rise because of the re-emergence of further refugees from 
hiding or the arrival of new evacuees from outside the town.1 Already on January , 
1944, officers and officials of the army’s economics and quartermaster staffs had dis-
cussed whether the relatives of those fit for work who could be deported as Ostarbei-
ter from the city should either be »brought back (which would mean that the home-
land would be burdened only with mouths unfit for work) or be left to their fate in 
Beitrag 1-3. 4. 44; KTB-Rückblick 1.4-30. 6. 44, T /110 /16, 30. Based on the misdating 
of the evacuation in these sources, Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, p.1099, has claimed that a 
second deportation of 40.000 civilians took place. This is, however, incorrect.
11 AOK 9 Ia / OQu / Qu., Evakuierung Bobruisk, 3. 3. 44, T31 /33 /910330.
11 KTB XXXIX PzK Qu, 1. 4. 44, T314 /953 /330-1; c. f. Zalozhniki vermakhta (wie Anm. 6), 
p. 1.
119 Hgr Mitte HeWiFü / OQu / VII/Qu., Personelle Räumung, Erfassung und Einsatz von Ar-
beitskräften, 9. 3. 44, gez. Krebs; similar in HeWiFü Mitte, ARLZ-Massnahmen in Weissru-
thenien und Südlitauen, 30. 4. 44, T /110 /65-663, 904-5; identical wording in XXXIX PzK 
Qu, Erfassung und Einsatz von Arbeitskräften, personelle Räumung, . 5. 44, T314 /953 /94.
10 KTB XXXIX PzK Qu, . 6. 44; XXXIX Pz K Qu Nr 5115 /43 geh, . 5. 44, T314 /953 /353, 4.
11 AOK  OQu / AWiFü / Qu., Erfassung der Zivilbevölkerung, . 5. 44; AOK  OQu / Ic / IVa / IVb / AWi-
Fü / VII/Qu., Durchführungsbestimmungen zum Befehl AOK  OQu / AWiFü / Qu. Nr 
360 /44 geh vom . 5. 44, . 5. 44, T31 /1300 /6-; 51-.
1 Lagebericht AWiFü PzAOK 3 16. 1. 43-15. 1. 44, T /11 /.
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Vitebsk.«13 At the start of March, the city was evacuated »according to the following 
standpoints: a) labour action Reich with families, rough sorting in Vitebsk, b) sepa-
ration of the families into Arbeitsfähige, ZADA-members and labourers for trench 
digging, c) the leftovers will be sheltered en bloc in villages in the army rear area and 
remain there.«14 The evacuation was conducted in conjunction with a 1-man labour 
selection Sonderkommando, who succeeded in ›recruiting‹ nearly 14.000 Ostarbeiter 
from Vitebsk in the first two weeks of March. A further 3.44 were transported to 
Chashniki rayon for local forced labour and 4.01 were evacuated to Alytus. At least 
6-.000 sick, elderly and unfit, however, remained in the city, which was already 
under Soviet artillery fire and aerial bombardment by the end of 1943.15
In late May, 3rd Panzer Army decided upon the removal of the residual civilian 
population of Vitebsk. Colonel-General Reinhardt signed the formal order for what 
was cynically codenamed Operation ›Himmelfahrt‹ (›Ascension Day‹) on May 6.16 
The planning for the deportation had begun much earlier. On May , the panzer 
army’s Qu., Lieutenant Dr. Westerkamp, conferred with the quartermasters of LIII 
Corps and VI Corps, in whose sectors respectively lay Vitebsk and the proposed site 
of a holding camp on the model of Ozarichi. Because of the high percentage of sick 
and crippled among the civilians to be evacuated, ›Himmelfahrt‹ was carefully plan-
ned. Transports were divided between two groups of the »march-capable« and two 
»march groups sick.«1 As at Ozarichi, the evacuees would pass through an initial 
three reception camps, but only a single Endlager was to be set up in the rear of 14th 
Infantry Division in whose sector a planned retreat was scheduled to take place. 
Again as at Ozarichi, the Army sought the involvement of the SD: Einsatzkommando 
9 was to oversee the evacuation. The final stretch of the footmarch from the rail sta-
tions would have to take place during darkness to avoid observation by Soviet forces. 
The planning also incorporated an elaborate cover story with which to deceive the 
evacuees as to their intended fate.
The German plan relied on more than deception and false promises to keep the 
deportees under control. On May 31, just prior to the actual execution of the opera-
tion, the troops of the 14th Infantry Division received the following order: »Fire is to 
be opened on civilians that flood back out of the ›Himmelfahrt‹ camp after the with-
13 Tätigkeitsbericht PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu., . 1. 44, NOKW-34; Lagebericht PzAOK 3 OQu / VII 
(Mil.Verw) Januar, 10. . 44; Februar, 1. 3. 44, T313 /316 /5943, 59450.
14 Ord.Offz. Chef WiStab Ost, Reisebericht über die Dienstreise Chef WiStab Ost zum HeWi-
Fü Mitte, WwiKdo Reval, WiIn Nord und WwiIn Ostland vom -11. 3. 44, T /1091 /1199.
15 Pz. AOK 3, O.Qu./Qu., Evacuation of Vitebsk, 3. 3. 44, NOKW-64, Case 1, PDB B, 
p. 95, also T313 /31 /5930-1; Lagebericht AWiFü PzAOK 3 16.3-15. 4. 44, T /119 /; He-
WiFü Mitte, Abt Arbeit, KTB-Beitrag, 6. 3. 44, T /110 /0; WiKdo 13 (Borissow) Gruppe 
Arbeit, Wochenberichte .-19. 3. 44, T /1146 /3-5.
16 Pz. AOK 3 Ia, Panzerarmeebefehl für Herauslösen der 14. Inf.Div unter Frontverkürzung im 
Raum Wyssotschany, 6. 5. 44, gez. Reinhardt, T314 /335 /15-6.
1 PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu., Evakuierung Witebsk. Besprechungsergebnis Qu. mit Quartiermeis-
ter LIII AK und anschliessend Quartiermeister VI AK am . 5. 44, T313 /31 /5996-; VI. 
AK Qu, Aktion ›Himmelfahrt‹, 4. 5. 44, T314 /335 /103-6.
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drawal of the rearguards to the new frontline.«1 In the event, the deportees received 
the news »apathetically.«19 The abandonment of the camp passed without incident 
on the night of June  /3; by 6pm on June 3, German spotters observed civilians lea-
ving the camp to the northwest, suggesting that complete surprise had once again 
been achieved over the Soviet forces.130 The after-action report for ›Himmelfahrt‹ 
written by VI Corps presented the ›result‹ almost in the form of a balance-sheet:
In total were brought from Vitebsk by rail transport:
March-capable    5.39
Sick      1.450 6.69
of whom were selected in the reception camp  1.1
Arbeits- and Wehrfähige    
Relatives of Hiwis, OD etc   906
Died during the march movement  30 5.41
Births     3 5.44131
As with Ozarichi, ›Himmelfahrt‹ was rapidly held up as a model for future practice. 
On June 10, Lieutenant Westerkamp observed that »even the chief of staff of IX 
Corps has declined the proposed evacuation of 3.000 arbeitsunfähige people to the 
region of Ushachi. The people shall remain in the corps region and perhaps at some 
time or other be treated as in ›Himmelfahrt‹.«13 It seems likely that only the advent 
of ›Bagration‹, the Soviet summer offensive which began on June , 1944, prevented 
further expulsions from taking place.
Conclusion
For all their novelty on the Eastern Front of the Second World War, Ozarichi and 
›Himmelfahrt‹ were not the first occasions when the German Army deliberately left 
behind for the enemy a civilian population deemed unfit for work. Almost exactly 
twenty-seven years before Ozarichi, during Operation ›Alberich‹, the withdrawal to 
the ›Hindenburg Line‹ in March 191, the Kaiserheer abandoned 40.000 unfit French 
civilians in St. Quentin while removing more than twice that number of able-bodied 
1 FS VI AK Ia an 14. ID, 99. ID, nachr. 56 ID, 31. 5. 44, T314 /335 /0.
19 VI. AK Qu, Erfahrungsbericht über die Aktion ›Himmelfahrt‹, 5. 6. 44, T314 /335 /46. See 
also the eyewitness account of a 40-year old woman caught up in the evacuation, who had 
evaded deportation from Vitebsk in March but had been caught during a razzia in the spring 
of 1944. Protokol doprosa Nadezhda Dukashenko, 1. . 49, NARB 61-1-5, pp.63-4 (USH-
MM RG 53.00M/).
130 KTB VI AK Ia, 1. 6. 44, 3. 6. 44, T314 /335 /15, 1.
131 VI AK Qu, Erfahrungsbericht über die Aktion ›Himmelfahrt‹, 5. 6. 44; Ia-Tagesmeldung 
vom 31. 5. 44 an PzAOK 3, T314 /335 /46, 1 (reporting 3 instead of 30 deaths).
13 Tätigkeitsbericht PzAOK 3 OQu / Qu., 10. 6. 44, NOKW-34. A further 1.00 civilians 
were resettled from Vitebsk into villages in Ushachi rayon left empty by ›Frühlingsfest‹ ear-
lier in the spring. Lagebericht PzAOK 3 OQu / VII (Mil.Verw.) Mai, 1. 6. 44, T313 /316 /5943.
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civilians.133 Nor was the stigmatisation and control of Arbeitsunfähige unique to the 
Nazi era. After the completion of ›Alberich‹, the German 1st Army ordered that civil-
ians registered as unfit for work in its rear area had to wear an armband marked by 
the letters ›A. U.‹ and their registration number.134
That the volume of the official history of the First World War covering ›Alberich‹ 
appeared in 1939, refreshing the memories of veteran officers135 and educating a 
younger generation, is one possible explanation for the frequency with which Wehr-
macht officers suggested or contemplated expelling unfit civilians over the frontline 
in the winter of 1941 /.136 Yet other than limited expulsions carried out at divisional 
level during the retreat from Moscow13, Wehrmacht occupation policy in 1941 and 
194 generally evacuated ›useless mouths‹ to the countryside in military-occupied rear 
areas13, and sometimes refrained from evacuating civilians at all, in spite of serious 
food shortages.139
Rather than contemplate expulsions over the frontline, during the course of 194 
and 1943, Army Group Centre instead evolved a strategy of dumping sizeable contin-
gents of unwanted civilians onto the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Up to mid-1943, 
approximately 100.000 civilians were so transferred, while between July 1943 and 
March 1944, no fewer than 33.31 were evacuated to the four districts of the Ost-
133 OKH (hrsg.), Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 191, Bd. 1, Berlin, 1939, pp.14-5.
134 Etappen-Inspektion 1 Ib, Organisation der Arbeitskräfte der Zivileinwohner, 5. 4. 1, IWM 
File 34900, Box .
135 See on this Johannes Hürter, Kriegserfahrung als Schlüsselerlebnis? Der Erste Weltkrieg in 
der Biographie von Wehrmachtgeneralen, in: Bruno Thoss / Hans-Erich Volkmann (Hg.), 
Erster Weltkrieg / Zweiter Weltkrieg. Ein Vergleich. Krieg, Kriegserlebnis, Kriegserfahrung 
in Deutschland, Paderborn 00, pp. 59-.
136 At least four examples can be named: KTB XXVII AK Ia, . 11. 41, T314 / /1169 (popula-
tion of Kalinin); Kdeur Inf.Regt 19, Befriedung, 4. 11. 41, T315 /96 /40 (Bryansk region); 
VO OKW/WiRüAmt AOK 1, Gedanken über die Evakuierung der Bevölkerung aus den 
Industriestädten im Donez-Gebiet im Interesse der Sicherheit und Ernährung der deutschen 
Wehrmacht, . 11. 41 (Abschrift), T /119 /90-1, also EC-339 (Donets region); VP 
04 /41 /6 g, Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Wirtschaftsführungsstabes Ost vom Don-
nerstag, den 1. Dezember 1941, unter Vorsitz von Herrn Staatssekretär Körner, T /1166 /619 
(Kharkov).
13 Two examples are known from the sector of nd Panzer Army: 5. Inf.Div. (mot) Ic, Tätig-
keitsbericht 3. 1. 41-31. 3. 4, T315 /13 /19; 1. Pz.Div. Ic, Tätigkeitsbericht, 4. 1. 41, 
T315 /14 /395.
13 Examples from other army groups can be found in Johannes Hürter, Die Wehrmacht vor 
Leningrad. Krieg und Besatzungspolitik der 1. Armee im Herbst und Winter 1941 /4, in: 
VfZg 49 (001), pp. 401-449, here: pp. 44 f.; Norbert Kunz, Das Beispiel Charkow: Eine 
Stadtbevölkerung als Opfer der deutschen Hungerstrategie 1941 /194, in: Christian Hart-
mann / Johannes Hürter / Ulrike Jureit (Hg.), Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Bilanz einer 
Debatte, München 005, pp. 136-144; Gert C. Lübbers, Die 6. Armee und die Zivilbevölke-
rung von Stalingrad, in: VfZg 1 (006), pp. -13.
139 Manfred Oldenburg, Ideologie und militärisches Kalkül. Die Besatzungspolitik der Wehr-
macht in der Sowjetunion 194, Köln 004, pp. 3-4 (Donets region under 1th Army).
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land.140 Even subtracting evacuees subsequently impressed as Ostarbeiter after re-
aching the Ostland, this population displacement significantly exceeded the 30.9 
Ostarbeiter recruited or deported from Army Group Centre between 194 and 1944.141 
Mortality among the evacuees to the Ostland was undoubtedly high, both while in 
resettlement camps such as Lesna and Alytus as well as after dispersal in the country-
side. Several hundred thousand more Russian civilians were evacuated over the course 
of 194 and 1943 to the exact same regions of eastern Belorussia that would make up 
the reduced army group zone of operations in 1943 /44; there, too, many evacuees 
died of hunger.14
By March 1944, however, evacuation out of the army and corps rear areas had lar-
gely ceased to be a possibility, while the mobilisation of the ZADAs had separated the 
fit from the unfit in a more systematic manner than hitherto. It was at this time that 
the four frontline armies devised ever more ingenious methods of corralling both the 
able-bodied and unfit population. The volte-face represented by Ozarichi and ›Him-
melfahrt‹ must be seen in this context, as one of several strategies that could be used 
to move civilians into the ›right‹ place in the Belorussian countryside. The dividing 
line between village and camp became practically erased. ZADA camps account for a 
significant proportion of the known forced labour camps on Belorussian soil, yet 
were rarely more elaborate than a converted peasant village.143 An astonishing variety 
of names were given to the quarters assigned to each group, reflecting the ever more 
careful categorisation and filtration of the population. Civilians were to be held in 
›Krankendörfer‹, ›Frauendörfer‹, ›Arbeitsdörfer‹, ›Sammeldörfer‹ or ›Sperrdörfer‹. In 
April 1944, the classification of the population became complete with the establish-
ment of the first ›Jugenddörfer‹ or ›Kinderdörfer‹ to accommodate children between 
the ages of eight and 14 evacuated from the forward areas.144 Not only were both the 
fit and the unfit confined to villages or camps, but in the winter of 1943 /44, they were 
increasingly transported to these holding pens by rail, in sharp contrast to the foot 
marches of the late summer and early autumn of 1943. The railway network not only 
enabled the deployment of civilian labourers as virtual tactical reserves, but also made 
possible the mass deportation to the Ozarichi camps.
140 WiStab Ost Chefgr Arbeit, KTB-Beitrag -. 4. 44, T /109 /35-9. 193.3 were resettled 
in the GK Weissruthenien, 69.34 in the region of Vilnius; 43.000 in Latvia and Estonia; 
6.5 were deported from the Ostland as Ostarbeiter to Germany.
141 Wi In Mitte / HeWi Fü Mitte, Lageberichte und Tätigskeitsberichte, T /109, 1099, 1100, 
1101, 110 passim; HeWiFü Mitte, Monatlicher Lagebericht, 6. 9. 44, T /66 /116.
14 Meldungen aus den besetzten Ostgebieten Nr. 49, 9. 4. 43, T15 /36 /59-9 (deaths 
among 50.000 evacuees in the Bobruisk region).
143 See V. I. Adamushko (ed.), Spravochnik o nemetsko-fashistskikh lageriakh, getto, drugikh 
mestakh prinuditel’nogo soderzhaniia grazhdanskogo naseleniya na vremenno okkupirovan-
noi territorii Belarusi v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny 1941-1945 gg., Minsk 199.
144 AOK 9 Ic / IcAO/OQu / Qu./VII, Errichtung von Jugenddörfern, 14. 5. 44, NA T31 /33 /910914; 
HeWiFü Mitte, Aktennotiz über die Besprechung am 1. 5. 44 unter Vorsitz von General-
leutnant Niedenführ, 14. 5. 44, NA T /110 /466.
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What emerges above all else from the records of the last nine months of Army 
Group Centre’s policies towards the Soviet civilian population is the warped clarity of 
the Wehrmacht’s perception of contingent circumstances such as Soviet military ad-
vances, shortages of food and housing, or typhus epidemics, and the consequences 
that would ›necesssarily‹ follow. As the examples quoted above demonstrate, there is 
a remarkable lack of overtly »Nazi« rhetoric to be found in the reports and orders 
relating to the civilian population from this phase, yet the discourse that evolved in 
the final phase of the occupation regarding fit and unfit civilians was nonetheless 
grounded in a thoroughly ideological, utilitarian doctrine of military necessity. The 
acceptance of the basic premises of living off the land for food and labour was near-
universal among the officer corps and officialdom of the army group, army and 
economics staffs. Small wonder, then, that different staffs arrived at such very similar 
›solutions‹ to the man-made humanitarian disaster that unfolded in eastern Belorus-
sia during the winter of 1943 and 1944.
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